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CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTIONS IN PHARMACY PRACTICE IN 
GREAT BRITAIN 
 
 
Zuzana Deans 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
Pharmacists who refuse to provide certain services or treatment for 
reasons of conscience have been criticised for failing to fulfil their 
professional obligations. Currently, individual pharmacists in Great 
Britain can withhold services or treatment for moral or religious 
reasons, provided they refer the patient to an alternative source. The 
most high-profile cases have concerned the refusal to supply 
emergency hormonal contraception, which will serve as an example 
in this paper.  
 
I propose the pharmacy profession’s policy on conscientious 
objections should be altered slightly. Building on the work of Brock 
and Wicclair, I argue that conscientious refusals should be 
acceptable provided the patient is informed of the service, the patient 
is redirected to an alternative source, the refusal does not cause an 
unreasonable burden to the patient, and provided the reasons for the 
refusal are based on the core values of the profession. Finally, I 
argue that a principled categorical refusal by an individual pharmacist 
is not morally permissible. I claim that, contrary to current practice, a 
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pharmacist cannot legitimately claim universal exemption from 
providing a standard service, even if that service is available 
elsewhere. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
As the new regulatory body for pharmacy, the General 
Pharmaceutical Council (GPhC) plans to review the conscience 
clause,1 which has historically focused on medicines for the control of 
fertility and conception or termination of pregnancy.2 In this paper I 
consider the possible justifications for a conscience clause with a 
view to suggesting alternative guidelines for practice. Conscience 
clauses are described in the pharmacy profession’s Standard of 
Conduct, Ethics and Performance and Guidance on the Provision of 
Pharmacy Services Affected by Religious and Moral Beliefs3 
(hereafter referred to as ‘Ethical Standards’ and ‘Guidance’ 
respectively). I will illustrate the discussion of conscience clauses 
                                                 
1 General Pharmaceutical Council (GPhC). 2010. Report on the Responses to the 
Consultation on the Revised Draft Standards. Available at:  
http://www.pharmacyregulation.org/pdfs/consultations/gphcstandardsconsultationre
portfinal0610.pdf [Accessed 12 July 2010]. 
2 J. Wingfield. Should Conscience Come Before Care? PJ. 2010; 284: 393. 
3 General Pharmaceutical Council (GPhC) Guidance on the Provision of Pharmacy 
Services Affected by Religious and Moral Beliefs. Available at: 
http://www.pharmacyregulation.org/pdfs/other/religiousmoralbeliefguidancev13.pdf 
[Accessed at 21 December 2010]. 
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using over the counter supply of emergency hormonal contraception 
(EHC) as an example.  
 
Emergency hormonal contraception 
 
Some community pharmacists hold conscientious objections to over-
the-counter supply of EHC and as such refuse to supply it. Some see 
this as an appropriate exercise of pharmacists’ rights to autonomy 
and integrity, while others view it as a contradiction of the 
professional obligations of pharmacists. Pharmacists are urged by 
the GPhC to ensure that if their “religious or moral beliefs prevent … 
[them] from providing a service, … [they inform] the relevant people 
or authorities and refer patients and the public to other providers.”4 In 
these cases it is accepted by the profession that the individual can 
make her own decision in a way that to some extent goes against the 
standard practice of the profession. 
 
The supply of EHC over the counter is one such standard practice, 
with relevant legislation introduced in 2001,5 and it has proven 
                                                 
4 General Pharmaceutical Council (GPhC) Standard of Conduct, Ethics and 
Performance 2010. Available at: 
http://www.pharmacyregulation.org/pdfs/other/gphcstandardsofconductethicsandpe
rflo.pdf [Accessed at 21 December 2010]. 
5 Prescription Only Medicines (Human Use) Amendment (No. 3) Order 2000 (S.I. 
2000, No. 3231). 
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controversial.6 Debate about EHC in academic literature and in the 
UK media has focused on the morality of its use, the morality of its 
supply, and whether pharmacists should be able to refuse to supply 
on moral or religious grounds. The fundamental objection to the 
supply of EHC is widely taken to be to the prevention of pregnancy 
and/or the termination of pregnancy,7 though there can be other 
complex reasons for refusal. In a study carried out by Cooper et al., 
reasons for refusal included discomfort at being used by the 
government to reduce rates of teenage pregnancy, and concern that 
                                                 
6 See for example: G. Barrett & R. Harper. Health Professionals’ Attitudes to the 
Deregulation of Emergency Contraception (or the Problem of Female Sexuality). 
Sociology of Health and Illness 2000; 22; 2: 197-216.; C. Dailard. Beyond the Issue 
of Pharmacist Refusals: Pharmacies That Won't Sell Emergency Contraception. 
The Guttmacher Rep Public Policy 2005; 8; 3.; A. S. Day. Emergency 
Contraception – When the Pharmacist Conscience Clause Restricts Access. 
Nursing for Women’s Health. 2008;12; 4; 343-346.; D. P. Flynn. Pharmacist 
Conscience Clauses and Access to Oral Contraceptives. J Med Ethics 2008; 34: 
517-520.; J. P. Kelleher. Emergency Contraception and Conscientious Objection. J 
Appl Pilosl. 2010; 27, 3: 290-304.; Letters in PJ. 2008; 281; 7518: 251-280.; P. 
Mallia. The Use of Emergency Hormonal Contraception in Cases of Rape - 
Revisiting the Catholic Position. Hum Reprod Genet Ethics 11; 2: 35-39.; L. Purdy. 
Is Emergency Contraception Murder?. Reprod Biomed Online 2009; 18; S1: 37-
42.; Stokes, P. 2008. Mother is Denied Pill by Muslim Pharmacist. Telegraph 3 
October. Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/3129625/Mother-is-
denied-pill-by-Muslim-pharmacist.html [Accessed 14/09/10]. 
7 This is controversial; some claim emergency hormonal contraception is a 
contraceptive only, while others claim it is an abortifacient because in some cases 
it takes effect after fertilisation. In each successful use it works in one of three 
ways: 1) ovulation is inhibited; 2) mucous of the cervix thickens, blocking sperm; or 
3) a fertilised blasotcyst is prevented from attaching to the lining of the uterus. 
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growing young women would be exposed to large doses of 
hormones.8  
 
The conscience clause of the GPhC’s Guidance offers a 
compromise, which is that the profession provides the services it 
offers, while also allowing individual professionals to refuse to make 
the supply themselves. In this paper I examine the key arguments for 
having a conscience clause and the key arguments against it. I 
consider current policy in the pharmacy profession in Great Britain. I 
argue that the Ethical Standards and Guidance should be altered to 
state explicitly that the refusal should not put unreasonable burden 
on the patient,9 and should be changed to prohibit principled blanket 
refusals. I also argue that conscientious refusals should be based on 
the core values of the profession, though I accept it may be difficult to 
translate this into policy.  
 
The first substantive part of the paper is an assessment of the key 
over-arching values behind conscience clauses, with an examination 
of moral distress and the relationship between conscience, integrity, 
                                                 
8 R. Cooper.; P. Bissell. & J. Wingfield. Ethical, Religious and Factual Beliefs About 
the Supply of Emergency Hormonal Contraception by UK Community Pharmacists 
J Fam Plann Reprod Health Care 2008; 34; 1; 47-50. 
9 Presently the Guidance states, as one of the points for pharmacists to consider 
before accepting employment, that pharmacists must make the patient their first 
concern. However, when the pharmacist’s moral or religious beliefs are in 
competition with fulfilling the patient’s needs, the pharmacist may appeal to the 
conscience clause. The implication of this is that the patient’s needs are not always 
the most important aspect to consider.  
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moral agency and doing the right thing. In the second substantive 
section I look more closely at integrity within a professional context, 
with the claim that the only legitimate conscientious objection is one 
that is based on the core values of the profession.  
 
The third substantive section is a discussion of how these 
conclusions could be used to inform policy. I will agree with Brock in 
accepting the incompatibility thesis as applied to individual 
professionals, but rejecting it as applied to the profession as a whole. 
I also come to broad agreement with Brock’s ‘conventional 
compromise’10 model of a conscience clause. I and add to this the 
ideal condition that conscientious refusals are only acceptable if they 
are based on the core values of the profession. I then argue that 
categorical conscientious refusals are not acceptable, even if the 
service could be provided by another pharmacist, since the 
conditions of the compromise demand that pharmacists make 
assessments on a case-by-case basis. These conclusions differ 
slightly from current policy in pharmacy practice in Great Britain. The 
arguments presented here may be applicable to other professions, 
but the specific claims I make which apply to policy have been 
considered in the context of pharmacy practice. 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 D. W. Brock. Conscientious Refusal by Physicians and Pharmacists: who is 
Obligated to do what, and why? Theor Med Bioeth. 2008; 29: 187-200. 
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WHY SHOULD WE ALLOW CONSCIENTIOUS REFUSALS? 
 
Broadly speaking, arguments in favour of conscience clauses are 
about: i) protecting an individual from moral anguish; ii) protecting 
moral integrity; and/or iii) accommodating a variety of views and 
beliefs. I will return to the last point in the second substantive section 
when discussing the core values of the profession. In this section I 
will pay attention to the first two points: protecting an individual from 
moral anguish and protecting moral integrity.  
 
 
Moral anguish 
 
It may be argued that conscientious refusals should be allowed 
because it would be harmful to force someone into moral distress 
(caused by acting against one’s conscience). One only needs to 
imagine being asked to do something one strongly disagrees with to 
appreciate the emotional force of conscience and integrity. As Benn 
puts it, “[a] person’s integrity may be violated if she is made to act 
against her conscience; the deepest values by which she defines her 
life are under assault. It is a cause of distress and anger that she 
should have to do what she thinks is wrong.”11 Pharmacists have 
                                                 
 
 
11 P. Benn. 2007. Conscience and Health Care Ethics. In Principles of Healthcare 
Ethics. R. Ashcroft, A. Dawson, H. Draper & J. McMillan, eds. UK: John Wiley & 
Sons Ltd.: 345-350: 345. 
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reported feeling “considerable ethical concern and anxiety” over the 
decision to deregulate EHC.12 The level of distress caused by being 
forced to act against one’s conscience should not be underestimated; 
after all, ‘discomfort’ can be of enormous magnitude. Cohen 
describes it as “excruciating moral anguish,”13 Wicclair as a 
“significant loss of self-respect”14 and Smith commented in a letter to 
the British Medical Journal that Savulescu’s arguments against 
conscientious refusals made him “feel physically sick”.15  
 
Benn dismisses such reasons for conscientious refusals as “weak” 
on the grounds that health care professionals routinely do things that 
cause distress and make them feel uncomfortable.16 It may be 
suggested this is not an entirely fair charge, since Benn is conflating 
moral distress with distress caused by those things that are 
agonising in themselves, for example “watching a patient die in 
pain.”17 Even so, I would agree with Benn that the ‘moral anguish’ 
argument is rather weak. While moral anguish may be indicative of 
the gravity of the values at stake, the anguish is not itself sufficient to 
justify the existence of a conscience clause. Benn is right that we 
accept professionals have to experience distress as part of their jobs. 
                                                 
12 Cooper; Bissell & Wingfield. op cit. note 8. 
13 C. Cohen. Conscientious Objection. Ethics 1968; 78, 4: 269-279: 269. 
14 M. R. Wicclair. Pharmacies, Pharmacists and Conscientious Objection. Kennedy 
Inst Ethics J 2006; 16, 3: 225-250: 244.  
15 V. P. Smith. Letter to editor. Br Med J 2006; 332, 7538: 425.; J. Savulescu. 
Conscientious Objection in Medicine. Br Med J 2006; 332, 7536: 294-297. 
16 Benn, op cit. note 11: 348. 
17 Ibid: 348. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this point. 
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Moral anguish is a type of anguish; it differs from other types of 
anguish in that it is a reaction to the moral wrongs or harms of a 
situation. In this particular context, it is caused by a (perceived) 
violation of integrity. What causes us concern about moral anguish is, 
I suggest, not the anguish itself, but the origin or cause of that 
anguish. 
 
Further, allowing a conscientious refusal only to avoid extreme moral 
anguish will frustrate the conscientious objector, who wants her view 
to be respected for the position it is, rather than be protected from 
distress. After all, she sincerely believes she is doing the right thing. 
This is exemplified when professionals are criticised for taking 
advantage of the availability of the conscience clause to avoid 
procedures they find merely unpleasant rather than morally 
objectionable.18 
 
In addition, while distress, anguish and other harms are in 
themselves negative and should be avoided wherever possible and 
reasonable, the onus rests with the defender of the conscientious 
refusal to show why moral anguish felt by a professional is enough to 
override the patient’s rights or interests when this is one of the core 
                                                 
18 M. Millward. Should pregnant doctors work in termination of pregnancy clinics? 
BMJ 2010; 340: 425. 
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values of the profession.19 This is particularly important given the 
asymmetric nature of the professional/ patient relationship.  
 
It is worth recognising the moral anguish that can be caused by 
acting against one’s conscience, and it is also worth minimising this 
kind of harm to professionals wherever reasonable and possible, but 
the existence of a conscience clause cannot be justified by this 
alone. Distress of the professional is not the crucial factor; it is 
conscience and integrity themselves that are of real concern.  
 
 
Conscience 
 
For the purposes of this paper I shall assume Curran’s definition: 
conscience is “the judgement about the morality of an act to be done 
or omitted or already done or omitted by the person”.20 Conscience is 
usually thought to be closely related to integrity, though tensions 
between them can exist.21 For this discussion I take conscience to be 
the judgement about the morality of the act and, roughly speaking but 
                                                 
19 Arguably, respecting a professional’s conscience may be a core value of the 
profession given the existence of the conscience clause. I shall not assume it is a 
core value, since this is the very thing whose justification I have set out to 
determine. 
20 C. E. Curran. 2004. Conscience. New Jersey: Paulist Press. 
21 For further discussion of such tensions see I. Shapiro & R. Adams., eds 1998. 
Integrity and Conscience. New York and London: New York University Press. 
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explained further below, I take integrity to be a commitment to acting 
morally. 
 
 
Personal integrity as a virtue 
 
‘Integrity’ has multiple definitions and understandings, but there are 
“clusters of shared intuitions”22 around the concept. For the purposes 
of this paper, I take integrity to be a virtue (or set of virtues), namely 
a commitment to acting morally, which includes a continual critical 
assessment (and sometimes adjustment) of one’s own position, and 
genuine consideration of other points of view.23 I use the terms 
‘integrity’ and ‘personal integrity’ interchangeably, assuming personal 
integrity to be potentially applicable and important to everyone. There 
are other types of integrity, for example professional integrity, which I 
shall come to later.  
 
Understanding integrity as a virtue has the important feature that acts 
of integrity are linked to the agent having a good grasp of what it is to 
act morally. It is set apart from Williams’ notion of integrity,24 which is 
a commitment to a personal, self-contained moral system, a fidelity to 
those principles and values one holds dear as part of one’s own life 
                                                 
22 D. Cox; M. La Caze & M. P. Levine. 2003. Integrity and the Fragile Self. England 
& USA: Ashgate: 1. 
23 This is informed by Cox; La Caze & Levine. Ibid. 
24 B. Williams. 1981. Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press: 40-53. 
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project. On this account an individual would have integrity if her 
actions were consistent with her values and beliefs, but those beliefs, 
values and actions need not be right on an objective level. The 
integrity I refer to also differs from what Ashford calls ‘objective 
integrity’,25 which demands that the agent’s set of values and 
behaviours corresponds so closely with objective morality that it 
would be impossible for someone to act with integrity and be morally 
mistaken.  
 
Common use of ‘integrity’ does imply a relationship with good 
behaviour, but it does not demand that the agent always gets it right. 
Because of limitations on how to evaluate what the right moral goals 
are, if integrity was measured against objective standards of morality 
we would all have great trouble assessing whether any individual had 
integrity. As it is, in everyday life we are pretty comfortable identifying 
numerous individuals with differing moral positions as people with 
integrity. Common use of the term ‘integrity’ accommodates a range 
of interpretations of what is good, including actions that do not in fact 
bring about a good outcome. This is not to say that acting with 
integrity is completely divorced from doing the right thing. It would be 
inappropriate to say a person had integrity just because she 
steadfastly and stubbornly stuck to her ill-considered principles. If we 
accept that features of integrity include thoughtfulness, moral 
reflection and accountability, it follows that a person with these 
                                                 
25 E. Ashford. Utilitarianism, Integrity and Partiality. J Phil. 2000; 97: 421–439. 
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virtues is unlikely to be utterly immoral. On this account integrity may 
be understood as a virtue that keeps in check the balance of other 
virtues. Thus, having the characteristic of integrity does not 
guarantee a person will do the right thing, but it is more likely. Cox, 
La Caze and Lavine put forward this view: “A person of moral 
integrity cannot be a moral monster … because attributions of 
integrity, being attributions of an important virtue, presuppose a 
certain moral success; the qualities that make for a character of 
integrity only constitute integrity when they succeed in making a 
person, with some degree of latitude, a good person.”26  
 
So integrity is not sufficient for moral action, and in fact it may 
sometimes lead to wrong action. Neither is integrity necessary for a 
morally desirable outcome (a person can act against her integrity and 
in doing so happen to bring about a good outcome). In the case of 
the supply EHC, for example, a pharmacist may act against her 
integrity and supply EHC because she would like to please her boss, 
even though she mistakenly believes the act of supplying EHC is 
wrong. Or a pharmacist may act with integrity when she refuses to 
supply EHC, but she may be mistaken in thinking that her refusal is 
morally right. 
 
It is sometimes thought that it would be wrong to pressurise someone 
to act against her integrity, even in cases in which acting with 
                                                 
26 Cox; La Caze. & Levine. op. cit. note 22, p. 69. 
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integrity may lead to wrongdoing or an undesirable outcome.27 If 
pressurising someone to act against her integrity is wrong, then 
potentially in this case there are two wrong actions from which to 
choose the lesser of two evils: pressurising someone to act against 
her conscience, or letting her do the wrong thing. Using the example 
of the supply of EHC, there might be a choice between two sets of 
circumstances. In one version of events, the pharmacist might deny 
the patient’s welfare needs, her right to access certain healthcare, 
and her right to make an autonomous decision. In another version, 
the profession might put pressure on the professional to act against 
her conscience. If integrity is not necessary for moral action, then 
pressurising someone to act against her integrity to bring about the 
best outcome could only be wrong if integrity should be valued for 
some other reason. Such reasons may be that we ought to respect a 
person’s viewpoint and moral reasoning, or that independence of 
moral deliberation is valuable and should be honoured rather than 
repressed.  
 
When one of the features of a profession is that it is made up of 
moral agents, integrity is a valuable quality. All things being equal, it 
is worth respecting because it is a feature of moral agency and in 
general should be encouraged because of its instrumental role in 
doing good. But, as discussed earlier, an agent may be mistaken, 
therefore she may not always perform good acts, and for that reason 
                                                 
27 Benn, op cit: note 11: 348. 
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limitations must be set. It seems to me that it would be very 
demanding, and ultimately unconvincing, to claim that respecting 
someone’s moral reasoning or giving sanctity to independence could 
be so valuable that to force someone to commit an act she thought 
was wrong would always be worse than allowing a different morally 
wrong action to occur. Moreover, individual moral agency is not the 
only relevant moral consideration. There is something special about 
acting with integrity in the professional setting. In this context, there is 
a set of professional duties, and the individual is not just a moral 
agent, but an agent of the profession. There is also a reasonable 
expectation that the individual upholds and endorses the values of 
the profession to which she belongs. 
 
 
 
INTEGRITY IN A PROFESSIONAL CONTEXT 
 
A profession can adopt a number of positions in relation to 
conscientious objections. It can i) deny the right to conscientious 
refusals, calling for all professionals to behave in a prescribed way; ii) 
allow conscientious refusals of any standard practice on the basis of 
any religious or moral grounds; iii) accept conscientious refusals for a 
selection of practices, and/or on the grounds of certain values. In this 
section, I propose that the pharmacy profession moves away from its 
current approach, which is to allow conscientious refusals of any 
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practice on the basis of any religious or moral grounds. I suggest that 
instead it should accept conscientious refusals for any practice on 
the grounds of certain values, namely the profession’s core values. It 
may not be possible to translate this into enforceable policy, but there 
may be other ways for the profession to indicate to its members what 
counts as appropriate and acceptable bases for using the conscience 
clause. I shall leave these practical considerations to one side, 
concentrating instead on what it means to act with integrity in a 
professional context. I challenge the notion that an individual could 
make a valid conscientious objection based on values that lie outside 
the core values of the profession.28 
 
 
Professional integrity 
 
Professional integrity is related to the particular norms and values of 
the profession in such a way that to act with professional integrity is 
to be committed to the values of the profession. Cox et al. describe 
professional integrity as “a matter of remaining true to the 
fundamental role and character of one’s profession – to its principles, 
values, ideals, goals and standards. This requires that a professional 
                                                 
28 Wicclair makes a similar point when he says conscientious refusals should be 
based on core values of the profession (M. R. Wicclair. Conscientious Objection in 
Medicine. Bioethics. 2000; 14; 3: 205- 227) and that the refusal should not 
contradict the recognised goals of the profession (Wicclair. Pharmacies, 
Pharmacists and Conscientious Objection Kennedy Inst Ethics J. 2006; 16; 3: 225- 
250.). 
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not merely remain true and publically endorse personal values and 
principles but that they remain true to the role they are publically 
entrusted with.”29  
  
 
 
 
Core professional values 
 
Ordinarily, a professional individual performs her duties competently 
and acts in accordance with the core values of the profession. 30  In 
exceptional circumstances, that individual will find that the duties she 
is expected to perform come up against her personal values, which is 
when she may feel the only way to preserve her integrity is to use the 
conscience clause.  
 
As mentioned at the start of the previous section, one of the reasons 
given for having a conscience clause is to accommodate a variety of 
views that arise from within a diverse society. The GPhC’s policy 
operates in exactly this way; any personal moral or religious value 
                                                 
29 Cox; La Caze. & Levine. op cit. note 22, p104. 
30 It is not easy to determine what the core values of the profession may be. 
Empirical research into the values of the pharmacy profession has been conducted 
by Benson, Cribb and Barber. (A. Benson; A. Cribb & N. Barber. Understanding 
Pharmacists' Values: A Qualitative Study of Ideals and Dilemmas in UK Pharmacy 
Practice. Soc Sci Med 2009; 68; 12: 2223 -2230.) Key ethical principles (but not 
‘values’) are explicit in the GPhC’s Standards of Conduct, Ethics and Performance. 
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can trump the values of the profession, as long as alternative 
provision is available for the patient. A person’s values may be 
religiously or culturally informed. The GPhC’s conscience clause 
accommodates the kind of variation brought about by diversity of and 
within society, culture and religion. I suggest this is a mistake 
because the GPhC is amalgamating and confusing two quite different 
types of conflict. First, conflict may arise when a professional 
considers that to provide a certain service or treatment would 
endanger not only her personal integrity, but also her professional 
integrity because she is being asked to do something that she 
sincerely believes the profession is mistaken to support given the 
fundamental ethos and pursuit of the profession. This type of conflict 
is important to recognise, and the moral objection should be heard by 
the profession. Second, conflict may arise when an individual’s views 
that are external to the pursuit of the profession prevent her from 
providing a service without compromising her integrity. These 
external values have not been arrived at by the collective body of 
professionals. They are out of reach of the profession but are given 
special status and protection by the conscience clause. The GPhC is 
assigning equal status to moral reasoning that belongs in the 
profession and moral and religious beliefs that are personally held 
independently of the profession. 
 
Because the GPhC’s conscience clause can be invoked for any 
moral or religious reason, pharmacists are allowed to deviate from 
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the core values of the profession whenever they judge that their 
moral or religious beliefs prevent them from providing a service. In 
this way an individual’s personal values are to some extent given 
preference over the profession’s values. This to me is one of the 
most puzzling aspects of the way the conscience clause is designed 
and used. It strikes me it is contradictory for the profession to 
collectively agree its norms and values and then permit an individual 
to act in a way that is contrary to those values. It seems 
straightforward that a profession could not claim to hold core value V 
and simultaneously state that it was acceptable for individuals to 
directly contradict core value V, since the profession would lose that 
value as part of its identity. If a professional does not want to carry 
out a certain service, she must surely have to give a good account of 
her reasons for this, and these reasons must be acceptable to the 
profession. For a pharmacist to conscientiously refuse to provide a 
service on the grounds of values that oppose the core values of the 
profession would be contrary to the profession and as such, for 
consistency, would require resignation or a move to another area of 
pharmacy that did not include providing this service. 
 
In preparation for the formation of the GPhC, there was a 
consultation about ethical standards among the pharmacy 
profession.31 There was some opposition to the GPhC’s intention to 
include the conscience clause on the grounds that it contravened the 
                                                 
31 General Pharmaceutical Council. op. cit. note 1. 
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RPSBG’s Code of Ethics principles, “Make the care of patients your 
first concern” and the guidance, “Consider and act in the best 
interests of individual patients and the public” and, “Make sure your 
views about a person’s lifestyle, beliefs, race, gender, age, sexuality, 
disability or other perceived status do not prejudice their treatment or 
care.”32 Presumably the concern was that personal integrity was 
being placed above professional obligations and ethical principles, or 
that the values of an individual professional were being placed above 
those endorsed by the profession. When an individual claims to 
make a conscientious refusal, she may a) have non-conscience 
related objection (e.g. she finds the task unpleasant); b) judge that 
performing the action would be a violation of a personally held value 
that is very important to her, but that lies outside the values of the 
profession; or c) judge that performing the action would be a violation 
of a personally held value that is very important to her, and that the 
act she is expected to carry out would not in fact satisfy the core 
values of the profession in the way the profession claims. Clearly a) 
is not a conscientious objection at all. I argue that although b) is 
recognised as a conscientious objection by the pharmacy profession, 
it should not be accepted. By my reasoning, c) is the only valid use of 
the conscience clause.  
 
Pharmacy, like other professions, is a live and evolving body. It is 
made up of individuals who reflect on their practice, which includes 
                                                 
32 Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain. 2007. Code of Ethics for 
Pharmacists and Technicians. Pharmaceutical Press, London.  
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assessing the ethical basis of their work. The profession has a set of 
values that may reflect, react to, or even influence the changing 
values of the wider culture and society in which it sits. Changes to 
accepted practice or attitudes occur relatively slowly. No one 
individual professional is likely to trigger a cultural shift in a 
profession, but collectively the continual self reflection will 
occasionally lead to a change in the consensus. The role of the 
individual moral agent is essential for the internal critique of the 
profession.   
 
It may be suggested that since the values of a profession can change 
over time, it would be unreasonable to expect individuals to leave the 
profession if the profession’s values or policy were to change 
radically. Radical changes in the profession’s values are very 
unlikely; changes are more commonly gradual refinements, or 
clarifications of how a value should be interpreted or applied. We can 
however expect to see more rapid changes to technology and 
services, and it is not unlikely that new services may come up 
against some pharmacists previously unchallenged personal values. 
Before EHC was available over the counter, pharmacists could hold 
certain values and provide all services. Some may now find that 
although the profession has not changed its core values, the 
introduction of the new service conflicts with their own values and 
beliefs. This conflict could take either of the two forms outlined 
previously: b) the individual judges that supplying EHC would be to 
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violate a personal value that is very important to her, but this value 
lies outside those of the profession; c) the pharmacist judges that to 
supply EHC would not in fact satisfy the core values of the profession 
in the way in which the profession claims it does.  In the second type 
of conflict, the pharmacist would be acting professionally if she were 
to make a conscientious refusal.  
 
Usually, when an individual becomes a professional pharmacist she 
agrees to the principles of the standards of conduct and ethics.33 
Being a sincere pharmacy professional is more demanding than 
simply providing services. It requires one to make moral judgements. 
Pharmacy practice has evolved into a values-based profession34 and 
ethics is a key feature of this.35 Even so, there may be cases in which 
                                                 
33 The exceptions to this are the pharmacists whose beliefs would prevent them 
from providing certain services. In such cases they would have to notify the 
profession of this. To avoid circularity, I shall leave this to one side. 
34 A. Cribb. & N. Barber. 2000. Developing Pharmacy Values: Stimulating the 
Debate - A Discussion Paper. London: Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great 
Britain. 
35 The definition of ‘profession’ is not settled; a hard and fast definition is difficult to 
pin down with a traits approach sometimes favoured. It is fairly typical for one of 
these traits to be the existence of a code of ethics, and a survey by Trauslen and 
Bissell established a list of characteristics most associated with professionalism, 
which included having a code of ethics. (J.M. Trauslen & P. Bissell. Theories of 
Professions and the Pharmacist Int J Pharm Pract 2004; 12: 107-114.) On the 
assumption that one of the essential characteristics of a professional is the 
capacity to make professional judgements, (R. O’Neill. 2001. Professional 
Judgement and Ethical Dilemmas. In Pharmacy Practice. K. Taylor & G. Harding, 
eds. London: Taylor and Francis: 203-226: 213.) including values-based 
judgements (A. Cribb & N. Barber. 2000. Developing Pharmacy Values: Stimulating 
the Debate - A Discussion Paper. London: Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great 
Britain), decisions with a moral dimension must be led by the pharmacist’s values. 
 23 
a pharmacist fulfils her duties and never raises a conscientious 
objection, but is motivated to fulfil her duties not through a shared 
sense of the profession’s core values, but because of external 
values. Take for example Christopher, a pharmacist whose values 
are based on Christianity. When interviewed about his ethical 
decision-making, Christopher said, “Every kind of moral or ethic that 
I’m faced with, ultimately, come back to my Christian experience and 
I’d measure it against my Christian value – whatever that was.”36 
While I claim that acting on the core values of the profession is 
necessary for making a conscientious refusal, I do not extend that to 
claim it is necessary for fulfilling standard duties and services. The 
difference lies in the need for sound justification for wandering from 
the standard. It would be pointless to criticise the basis on which 
Christopher makes his decisions if he always fulfils his duties fully 
and competently. Notice that if Christopher were to make a 
conscientious refusal on the basis of his religious beliefs, the GPhC 
would accept this, even though Christopher’s fundamental reasoning 
would be detached from the non-religious values that underpin the 
pharmacy profession. 
 
                                                                                                                            
See also: J. Edmunds. & M. W. Calnan. The Reprofessionalisation of Community 
Pharmacy? An Exploration of Attitudes to Extended Roles for Community 
Pharmacists Among Pharmacists and General Practitioners in the United Kingdom’ 
Soc Sci Med. 2001; 53: 943-955.; E. Freidson, 1994. Professionalism Reborn: 
Theory, Prophecy, and Policy. Chicago: Chicago University Press.; T. Parsons 
1954. Essays in Sociological Theory. New York: Free Press. 
36 From R. J. Cooper; P. Bissell & J. Wingfield. Ethical Decision-making, Passivity 
and Pharmacy. J Med Ethics. 2008; 34: 441-445 (443). 
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It is possible that a pharmacist could believe she was acting within 
the core values of the profession, but interpret those values 
differently to others. This may be the case in some instances of 
refusal to supply EHC. Suppose for example one pharmacist, 
George, believes the soul is created when life begins, which, he 
believes, is when egg and sperm unite to become the two-celled 
zygote. George understands that EHC is not an abortifacient, and he 
is correct in his belief that the use of EHC could destroy a zygote. 
George believes all humans that are presented to him at his 
pharmacy are his patients. Subsequently, George believes both the 
woman and the zygote are his patients. George shares the core 
values of the profession. Let us suppose one of the core values of 
the profession is that the patient’s interests are of great importance. 
Suppose another pharmacist, Luke, also believes that souls exist, but 
believes that the soul does not come into existence until after birth 
when a human develops the faculties of autonomy and sentience. 
Luke also understands that EHC is not an abortifacient. Luke shares 
the core values of the profession, and believes he is only presented 
with one patient when a pregnant woman enters his pharmacy, and 
that she, as his patient, is his main concern. 
 
Leaving to one side arguments about the woman’s right to choose, 
and the interests of the pregnant woman, George has a 
conscientious objection to supplying EHC. Luke has no such 
objection. The only differences in their positions are their beliefs 
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about the moral and ontological status of the united egg and sperm 
cells. George and Luke have arrived at two different decisions about 
what should be done, and both claim to be able to justify their 
decisions on the grounds of the core values of the profession. The 
origins of some positions will be met with more understanding than 
others, and I suspect the more familiar belief systems (recognised 
religions, for example) would be met with greater understanding than 
the less well-known, some of which may be classed as eccentric, or 
mistaken. Imagine George is asked to justify his position to his peers. 
I suggest a sensible assessment of whether this was an acceptable 
use of the conscience clause would consider what George 
understood the core values to be, how he came to decide that 
supplying EHC would contravene those values, and whether his 
position was held sincerely. George’s peers may conclude his 
position is valid, they may even re-consider the profession’s stance 
on supplying EHC. Alternatively, they may decide that George’s 
fundamental beliefs are so out of kilter with the scientific basis upon 
which pharmacy rests that he is mistaken and that this has led to a 
misapplication of the core values.  
 
Now suppose that, in a slight variation, George does not believe the 
zygote is his patient, but he does believe that destroying a soul is a 
mortal sin, and that for that reason he thinks it is not in the woman’s 
best interests to take EHC, and so he refuses to make the supply. In 
such a case I would doubt whether this interpretation of ‘best 
 26 
interests’ would match the profession’s understanding of the concept, 
or what are regarded as relevant considerations in assessing best 
interests. As such, George would not be acting in accordance with 
the core values of the profession, and so his conscientious refusal 
should be invalid. 
 
Suppose George does not think the zygote is his patient, and neither 
does he think the woman should herself be prevented from taking 
EHC, but he does not want to supply EHC to her because he does 
not want to participate in the destruction of a soul. Let us also 
assume it would be in the patient’s best interests to take EHC. This is 
perhaps the most realistic version of this scenario. In such a case, 
George would not be acting in accordance with the core values of the 
profession in refusing to make the supply. Instead, George would be 
placing his personal values above those of the profession. He could 
not claim with any sincerity that he was assessing what the core 
values of the profession really meant and how they should be applied 
in these circumstances. So by my argument George could not 
justifiably use the conscience clause in this case. 
 
Allowing conscientious refusals for any moral or religious reason is, I 
have argued, a mistake. Professional integrity is important in a self-
reflective, values-based profession. Allowing a pharmacist to deviate 
from the standard that has been agreed by the profession is only 
justifiable when the non-compliance is the result of honest 
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disagreement of how the profession’s values should be applied. In 
contrast, it should not be acceptable to deviate from standard 
practice by appeal to external, potentially unsubstantiated moral or 
religious beliefs that are not endorsed by the profession. 
 
 
THE CONSCIENCE CLAUSE 
 
So far, the discussion has centred on the importance of integrity and 
how a profession’s core values should be compatible with a 
professional’s actions. One of the key objections to conscientious 
refusals is that a patient may be denied a treatment or service that 
she would normally be entitled to receive. In order to overcome this 
problem, the pharmacy profession adopts a compromise model of 
the conscience clause. In theory, this allows a pharmacist to 
preserve her integrity while the profession fulfils its role as a service 
provider. In the first part of this section I outline Brock’s defence of 
the compromise position against the charge that professionals are 
not fulfilling their duties when they refuse to provide treatments or 
services.37 In the second part I argue that, since one of the key 
factors in the compromise model I have argued for is dependent on 
particular circumstances, blanket refusals are not acceptable. 
 
 
                                                 
37 D. W. Brock. op cit. note 10. 
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The conventional compromise  
 
The conscience clause of the GPhC’s Guidance and Ethical 
Standards offers a compromise, which is that the profession provides 
the services it is obliged to provide while also allowing individual 
professionals to refuse to make the supply themselves. A similar 
model of a compromise has been proposed by Brock, and is termed 
the ‘conventional compromise.’ It has three components: 1) the 
professional informs the patient about the relevant service or 
treatment; 2) the professional refers the patient to someone who can 
provide that service or treatment; 3) the referral does not put 
unreasonable burden on the patient.38 The term ‘unreasonable 
burden’ is vague but its assessment might include consideration of 
financial or psychological burdens and inconveniences. The 
availability of a service or treatment is relative to the patient and her 
circumstances, so that someone who was, for example, without 
transport or in distress and vulnerable, may be considered unable to 
easily access the treatment from an alternative source. Such 
considerations and qualifications require further exploration 
elsewhere. 
 
 
Incompatibility thesis 
 
                                                 
38 Ibid.  
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Critics of conscientious refusals sometimes claim the incompatibility 
thesis, which is that to refuse to supply a treatment or service 
promised by the professional body is to fail to meet one’s 
professional obligations.39 The incompatibility thesis can be broken 
down into the obligations of the professional body and the obligations 
of the individual professional. The incompatibility thesis applies to the 
profession as a whole since it carries an obligation to supply EHC, 
and it would be failing as a profession if EHC was not actually 
available to patients. The incompatibility thesis does not apply to 
individuals, since in refusing to supply EHC and directing the patient 
elsewhere, that individual pharmacist has not prevented the 
profession from fulfilling the obligation to supply EHC.40 Under the 
conditions of the conventional compromise, the pharmacist would 
have to redirect the patient to a compliant pharmacist who was 
reasonably accessible to that patient.  
 
 
Moral responsibility 
 
Conscience clauses may be criticised for failing in their primary aim, 
which is to allow the professional to have a clear conscience.41 One 
of the ways in which a conscience clause is usually thought to 
                                                 
39 Savulescu., op. cit. note 15. 
40 Brock, op. cit. note 10, 193. 
41 Wicclair. op cit. note 14. 
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preserve integrity is in allowing the individual to distance herself from 
wrongdoing and have a clear conscience that, whatever supposedly 
immoral action eventually occurs, she is not responsible for it. 
However, under current guidelines, the objecting pharmacist cannot 
evade participation entirely, given that the profession adopts a policy 
that conscientiously objecting pharmacists are obliged to direct the 
patient to another source of EHC. Re-directing a patient to another 
pharmacist who is prepared to supply EHC is to be complicit to some 
extent in making the supply. If acting with integrity requires not 
participating in wrongdoing (at the least as perceived by the 
individual pharmacist), then it looks like the GPhC guidelines fall 
short of protecting integrity. 
 
Take for example Sarah, a pharmacist who refuses supply of EHC 
but directs the patient to another pharmacist who makes the supply. 
Sarah’s actions are not sufficient for the patient to take EHC (i.e. re-
directing does not guarantee that EHC will eventually be taken, and 
other agents are necessarily involved), but her involvement was 
necessary in this particular series of events for the patient to take 
EHC. As such, Sarah cannot evade responsibility entirely. However, 
this is not as problematic as it initially appears. First, it may be that 
doing what is instructed or requested of you, but not what you have 
singularly decided upon, or that re-directing the patient elsewhere, is 
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to have ‘diluted’ responsibility for the action.42 Dilution of 
responsibility may reduce culpability sufficiently that the pharmacist 
correctly perceives that she has not committed any wrong-doing, 
even by her own standards.43 
 
The second reason for thinking a pharmacist can preserve her 
integrity when she re-directs the patient is that the conscience clause 
policy is by its very nature a compromise, which for the pharmacist 
means a moral compromise. It has been suggested that moral 
compromise can be compatible with moral integrity because it can be 
a fulfilment of a deeper level of responsibility, which is to meet 
commitments to others.44 Although Sarah believes that to supply 
EHC is to misapply one of the core values of the profession, she 
acknowledges that her view is not an established one among her 
peers. She may think, for example, that supplying EHC is not in the 
patient’s best interests when the principle ‘make patients your first 
concern’ is properly understood. She may think it is time for the 
profession to re-assess its understanding of best interests, and 
indeed she may voice those views to her peers. However, she 
                                                 
42 For further discussion of this see G. Mellema. Shared Responsibility and Ethical 
Dilutionism. Australas J Philos 1985; 63, 2: 177-187. 
43 Empirical evidence shows that in some cases pharmacists who refuse to supply 
EHC over the counter will supply EHC if it has been prescribed by a doctor 
because they feel less responsible. Cooper; Bissell & Wingfield., op cit. note 8. 
44 See B. J. Winslow & G. R. Winslow. Integrity and Compromise in Nursing Ethics. 
J Med Philos. 1991; 16 (3) 307- 323. and J. D. Goodstein. Moral compromise and 
personal integrity: exploring the ethical issues of deciding together in organizations. 
Bus Ethics Q. 2000; 10; 4: 805-819.  
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recognises that her opinion is in the minority, and she holds a higher 
value, which is to not stand in the way of patients accessing services 
the profession has agreed to provide.  
 
Thus for many pharmacists, it is quite possible that re-direction would 
be a compromise they would and should be content with, since they 
would have diluted their responsibility without depriving the patient of 
the service they have a duty to help provide to some extent. It is also 
worth noting that in the report of the GPhC’s consultation, the issue 
of responsibility did not arise. The only objection to the inclusion of a 
conscience clause was its incompatibility with the principles of the 
RPSGB’s code of ethics (which are now in the GPhC’s Ethical 
Standards).  
 
In light of the discussion so far I suggest that the current compromise 
model is sound. I suggest that ideally there would be an additional 
condition, which is that refusals must be based on the core values of 
the profession. However, I accept the substantial practical and 
epistemic problems in identifying, defining and describing these 
values. In the final subsection I will show that it follows that 
pharmacists cannot legitimately claim a blanket refusal to provide a 
service, even if that service is easily available elsewhere. 
 
 
Against categorical refusals 
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Discussions surrounding whether and how a conscientious objection 
should feature in the ethical standards of the GPhC has included the 
suggestion that pharmacists should display a notice in their 
pharmacies.45 I am working on the presumption that the suggestion is 
that this notice would inform patients of the pharmacist’s objection to 
supply EHC. The implication of this would be that a pharmacist could 
make a categorical refusal. Indeed, there is nothing stated in the 
current policy to suggest that a pharmacist cannot make a blanket 
refusal, as long as the pharmacist refers the patient to an alternative 
source that is accessible within the timeframe required for EHC to be 
effective. The point I make here is very straightforward but important 
given the GPhC’s deliberations over policy on this issue. My claim is 
simply that the set of justifiable conditions for a conscientious refusal 
are circumstantial and, as such, pharmacists should not be permitted 
to refuse a service or treatment without proper consideration of the 
circumstances of each case.  
 
Pharmacists who refuse to supply EHC over the counter fall into 
three categories: those who always supply (provided the standard 
clinical conditions are met); those who sometimes supply, depending 
on the situation; and those who never supply.46 By my argument, 
categorical refusal is not justified. It is possible that for every case 
presented to a certain pharmacist, the pharmacist meets each 
                                                 
45 General Pharmaceutical Council., op. cit. note 1. 
46 Cooper; Bissell & Wingfield., op. cit. note 8. 
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condition of the conventional compromise. By that I mean it is 
possible that in all cases the pharmacist has an objection, this 
objection does not contradict the core values of the profession, and 
the patient can be re-directed to an alternative source without taking 
on an unreasonable burden. However, it is not necessarily the case 
that all these conditions will be met. For example, it is not necessarily 
the case that the patient will be able to find an alternative source of 
the service without undergoing significant inconvenience or distress. 
Given this, it is unjustifiable for a pharmacist to hold a categorical 
refusal with no capacity to accommodate situations in which a patient 
would be unreasonably burdened by the refusal, or would for some 
reason be unable to easily access the service elsewhere. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Pharmacy as a profession holds a set of obligations towards its 
patients. The professional body must ensure that the individuals 
making up the profession fulfil those obligations wherever possible, 
and that the profession as a whole fulfils its obligations. In a values-
based profession, moral integrity is of great importance; it can be 
instrumental in bringing about good action and it is precious to the 
moral agent. For these reasons, integrity should be protected by a 
conscience clause where reasonable. Current policy for pharmacy 
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practice in Great Britain accepts refusals for any moral or religious 
reason. I have made the case that conscientious objections are only 
valid if they are based on values that do not contradict the core 
values of the profession. I accept the difficulties in determining what 
these values are, how they should be interpreted and how such a 
policy would be enforced. 
 
The GPhC’s policy states the patient must be the pharmacist’s first 
concern, but it is not clear what this means. I would suggest that 
when the policy is reviewed by the profession the GPhC considers 
stating explicitly that patients should not be put under unreasonable 
burden by a conscientious refusal. I have also made the case that 
categorical refusals by pharmacists are not acceptable. There may 
well be circumstances in which a refusal would cause unreasonable 
burden on the patient, so each request for EHC should be assessed 
on a case-by-case basis.  
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